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Introduction: This paper explores definitions of death from the perspectives of several world and indigenous
religions, with practical application for health care providers in relation to end of life decisions and organ and
tissue donation after death. It provides background material on several traditions and explains how different
religions derive their conclusions for end of life decisions from the ethical guidelines they proffer.
Methods: Research took several forms beginning with a review of books and articles written by ethicists and
observers of Bön, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Indigenous Traditions, Islam, Judaism, Shinto and Taoism. It
then examined sources to which these authors referred in footnotes and bibliographies. In addition, material was
gathered through searches of data bases in religious studies, general humanities, social sciences and medicine
along with web-based key word searches for current policies in various traditions.
Results: Religious traditions provide their adherents with explanations for the meaning and purpose of life and
include ethical analysis for the situations in which their followers find themselves. This paper aims to increase
cultural competency in practitioners by demonstrating the reasoning process religions use to determine what they
believe to be the correct decision in the face of death.
Conclusion: Patterns emerge in the comparative study of religious perspectives on death. Western traditions show
their rootedness in Judaism in their understanding of the human individual as a finite, singular creation. Although the
many branches of Western religions do not agree on precisely how to determine death, they are all able to locate a
moment of death in the body. In Eastern traditions personhood is not defined in physical terms. From prescribing the
location of death, to resisting medical intervention and definitions of death, Eastern religions, in their many forms,
incorporate the beliefs and practices that preceded them. Adding to the complexity for these traditions is the idea that
death is a process that continues after the body has met most empirical criteria for determining death. For Hinduism
and Buddhism, the cessation of heart, brain and lung function is the beginning of the process of dying—not the end.
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This paper explores definitions of death from the
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strating the reasoning process religions use to determine
the correct decision in the face of death.
Research for this explication and analysis took several
forms beginning with a review of books and articles
written by key ethicists in Judaism, and various forms of
Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism. It then examined
sources to which these authors referred in footnotes
and bibliographies. In addition, material was gathered
through searches of data bases in religious studies, gen-
eral humanities, social sciences and medicine along with
web-based key word searches for current policies in
various traditions.
In his personal statement contained within the President’s
Council on Bioethics white paper on determinations of
death, Edmund Pelligrino noted:
The so-called “definitions” of death fall into two
categories: the philosophical and the empirical. The
first seek a conceptual understanding of the essential
differences between life and death. The second seek to
determine the clinical signs, tests, or criteria which
separate life and death most accurately [1].
The debate about the specifics of empirical definitions
that began in earnest in the mid 1960’s continues today.
George Khushf has noted that “in most of the current
biomedical literature, the purely biological character of
any death concept is simply asserted as a premise, and
subsequent reflection attempts to clarify the nature of
such a biological concept” ([2], p.339). These biologically
based definitions have developed for several reasons.
New life sustaining technologies, including artificial
heart-lung machines, the ability to transplant life sus-
taining organs and compliance with the dead donor rule
for the purposes of post mortem transplantation, require
precision in determining a specific moment when death
can be pronounced. Because of the need for biological
clarity in understanding the point of death, there are a
wide range of articles offering different opinions on how
to make appropriate empirical assessments. While there
are well published religious perspectives on organ/tissue
donation after death, there is a relative paucity of litera-
ture regarding religious perspectives on death determin-
ation itself.
The diverse and complex religious perspectives of the
world’s religious traditions on this issue has not yet been
explored in the kind of detail one sees in the scientific-
ally focused literature. Scholars have provided solid
scholarship on a range of religious traditions under-
standing of determining death. For example, individuals
such as Damien Keown [3] and Karma Leske Tsomo [4]
discuss Buddhist perspectives, Omar Sultan Haque [5]
provides material on Islamic ethics and end of life issues,Yitzchok Breitowitz [6] gives an overview of contempor-
ary Jewish perspectives, and Aaron Mackler provides a
comparative analysis of Jewish and Roman Catholic
Bioethics [7]. Several anthologies, most notably Lucy
Bregman’s three volume Religion, Death and Dying in-
cludes individual articles on a number of religious tradi-
tions. Chaplains Sue Wintz and George Handzbo have
produced a Handbook for healthcare professionals con-
taining useful information from a wide range of tradi-
tions on a variety of bio-medical ethical issues including
determining death and withdrawing support [8]. There
is not, however, one source that provides an overview of
the ethical decision making that occurs as various reli-
gions think about death and determine that it has oc-
curred. This article fills that void by providing a starting
point for the analysis of end-of-life determinations. It
uses the perspective and methodology of comparative re-
ligion to provide an overview of the basic features of in-
dividual traditions, to discuss how they view life and
death and to explore how they make moral decisions in
the face of death.
When confronting issues at the edges of life, religious
perspectives can become especially influential because
they explain the nature of the human individual, the goal
of life, the reasons for death and for most, what happens
after the death of the body. Because religions provide a
way of interpreting the world, individuals living in the
midst of a particular tradition can continue to be influ-
enced by it even if they have stopped believing or
practicing.
The category of brain death that predominates in
Western allopathic medical systems relies on a definition
of death that emerges from a concept of the human be-
ing that is heavily influenced by ancient Greek thought
and Descartes’ concept, cogito ergo sum; both place
greater value on the mind and brain than on other bod-
ily organs. Traditions that do not share these influences
construe their understandings of death from sources
within their cultures and faiths and can reject determi-
nations of death that center on the brain. In the United
States, two states, New York and New Jersey, have
enacted legal protections for individuals holding reli-
gious views that differ from the standard definitions of
death.
Until the middle of the twentieth century, death was
something observed. Breathing stopped and so did the
beating of the heart. Prior to the introduction of mech-
anical ventilators in the mid-20th century and the evolu-
tion of resuscitative measures, a non-brain or circulation
formulation was used to determine death. The concept
of brain death was influenced by two major advances in
health care in the 1960’s: the development of intensive
care units with artificial airways and mechanical ventila-
tors that treated irreversible apnea, thus interrupting the
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The concept of brain death also addressed ethical con-
cerns associated with organ donation that arose from
the then-new discipline of transplant surgery. The clin-
ical appearance of brain death was first described by
French researchers Mollaret and Goulan who coined the
term coma dépassé in their seminal 1959 work [9] and
described “a state beyond coma”, in which loss of
consciousness, brain stem reflexes, and spontaneous res-
piration was associated with absent encephalographic
activity.
Mechanical respirators complicated the situation since
they could breathe for a patient. The situation of the ar-
tificially maintained patient developed. By the latter half
of the 20th century a view of death that did not look to
breathing or a beating heart prevailed in most American
and European hospitals. This view has its root in the
1968 Harvard Ad Hoc Committee on Brain Death, a
committee that was formed to address a number of is-
sues including finding a definition of death that would
permit the removal of organs before they deteriorated
from lack of circulation [10]. Though this definition is
not without opponents from various medical, moral,
cultural and religious perspectives, it now dominates
European and North American medicine.
Families of religions and definitions of death
The families of religions can be classified in three basic
ways: The Western or Abrahamic traditions of Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam; Eastern Traditions which include
Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism, and indigenous faith
systems, also called aboriginal, primal or archaic reli-
gions (from the Greek arché, original). Within these
families of religions there are shared ideas about the na-
ture of the human individual and the world; there can
be differences, of course, but, basic features define and
unite them.
Western traditions
Judaism, Christianity and Islam trace their roots to a
single ancestor, Abraham, and are united by the way in
which they construe human life. All three believe the in-
dividual to be a unique creation of God whose life begins
at a specific point in time; all understand the human as
remaining him or herself throughout life and into the
afterlife. All three determine death by looking at the ces-
sation of bodily organs, such as the heart, lungs or brain.
bTo interpret contemporary moral issues, Western tradi-
tions rely heavily on their Scriptures and on authorita-
tive interpretations of their sacred texts.
Judaism
The three largest movements within contemporary
Judaism are Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. Allthree agree on key theological precepts such as monothe-
ism, reverence for Scripture, and the celebrations of
Judaic traditions such as Yom Kippur and Passover.
When they differ, the issues center on practice, require-
ments for ordination and conversion, and interpreting
contemporary moral issues. To determine whether an ac-
tion is compliant with Jewish law, halacha, Judaism will
turn to Biblical sources and key interpretations. These
include the older writings Mishnah, and Talmud, and
contemporary rabbinic rulings called Responsa. These
are used in much the same way contemporary secular
law turns to legal precedent to analyze current cases.
Orthodoxy believes that obedience to Jewish law is
mandatory because it comes from God and is the most
traditional in their understanding of Biblical mandates.
When dealing with complex issues, Orthodox Jews will
turn to their Rabbi to interpret and understand the
course of action that is in keeping with the Law.
Conservative Jews also believe that Jewish law is bind-
ing, but view the law as developing through both God
and human interpreters in a process that continues in
the present ([11], p.278). Thus, like their Orthodox
counterparts, Conservative Jews will use Scripture and
tradition and defer to the ruling of their Rabbi, but their
rulings are often more flexible than those of Orthodox
rabbis ([12], p.3).
Reform Judaism is the most liberal of the three, it
champions individual autonomy and believes that
Judaism must adapt to the contemporary situation.
Though a Reform Jew may consult a Rabbi, the Rabbi’s
view is just one factor in determining the morality of a situ-
ation. Reform Jews will use extra-halachic materials so that
Jewish law is just one of several sources that may be used
[12]. The decision of the individual and family in determin-
ing the morality of an action is allowed. On the issue at
hand, determination of death, there are wide variations
across all three groups and within them as well.
As there is no central authority in any of these move-
ments, responses to complex moral issues will vary be-
cause of cultural considerations such as nationality or
generation. Nonetheless, all three groups would agree
that all of life is a gift from God and should be protected
and maintained, that humans received the gift of life
through the breath of God as recorded in both Genesis
and Leviticus where God breathes into Adam in order to
enliven him. In addition, taking care of the body is an
obligation, since the body belongs to God.
Authoritative ancient sources did not face the situation
of a patient whose breath stopped but whose heart con-
tinued beating for more than a few seconds or minutes
at most. So while cessation of breath and the resulting
cessation of a heartbeat was the traditional test for
death, the ventilator raises new issues. Spontaneous
respiration has ceased because of brain death, but
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brain dead patient is the focus of considerable con-
temporary discussion.
Reform and Conservative Judaism overwhelmingly
accept neurological criteria and have, according to Elliott
Dorff, since shortly after the Harvard Criteria appeared
([11], p.259). But within Orthodox Judaism, there are
two competing opinions on the appropriate way to
determine that an individual has died. One side ac-
cepts neurological criteria as outlined by the Harvard
Committee; the other does not, insisting instead that
cessation of heartbeat is the only valid criterion [6].
Those within Orthodoxy who accept neurological cri-
teria in determining death draw on a variety of commen-
taries to support their view. First, they consult an
eleventh century ruling of revered interpreter, Rashi who
described [13] the appropriate response to a person
trapped in a collapsed building on the Sabbath. Rashi
advises uncovering the patient’s nose. If there is breath,
attempts to free the person from the rubble can con-
tinue because the Sabbath may be violated to save a life;
if there is no breath, the work should cease. Nineteenth
century authority and rabbi, Moshe Sofer, (1762–1839) and
twentieth century rabbi, Moshe Feinstein c understand
this to mean that ‘that halachic death depends on cessa-
tion of respiration” [14]. This is then combined with a
twelfth century text, The Babylonian Talmud written by
Maimonides [15] that discusses whether decapitated ani-
mals that move are alive or dead. The text’s author
writes, “even if they move convulsively like the tail of a
newt that twitches spasmodically [after being cut off],”
they are dead [16]. This pro-neurological group likens the
beating heart to spasmodic movement in animals and con-
siders it extraneous movement, not determinant of life.
Because there would be no respiration without mechanical
support, Feinstein determined that a patient with no spon-
taneous respiration should be considered dead [17].
In 1987, The Israeli Chief Rabbinical Council drew on
these and other interpretations to affirm the use of
neurological criteria and noted five prerequisites for
establishing the state of brain death:
A. Clear knowledge of the cause of the injury.
B. Absolute cessation of spontaneous breathing.
C. Detailed clinical proof of injury to the brain.
D. Objective proof of destruction of the brain stem by
objective scientific tests, such as the electrical
brainstem testing.
E. Proof that the absolute cessation of respiration and
inactivity of the brain stem continue for at least
twelve hours despite full, customary intensive care [18].
The opposition to this ruling relies on some of the
same sources to substantiate its own view [19]. Rabbi J.David Bleich, author of books, articles and Responsa on
this issued, begins his opposition by stating that it is in-
appropriate to use scientific or medical criteria to make
any determination of death, these decisions, he believes
are the purview of moral and religious domains [20].
“Medicine,” he says, “does not define death; it defines
physiological states” [21]. He pronounces death to be the
cessation of all cardiac and respiratory activity and all
movement. To make these rulings he draws on the same
commentaries the opposition uses, but points to a sec-
tion they do not use [22] and comes to a different con-
clusion. “But as long as he lies like an inanimate stone
and has no pulse, if afterward breathing ceases, we have
only the words of our holy Torah [to rely on and deter-
mine] that he is dead [16]. Bleich considers the rhythmic
and continuing beating of the heart to be movement
that is not comparable to the spasms occurring after
decapitation.
The opposition between these two views has endured
for more than fifty years; each side produces volumes of
materials, Responsa and arguments to bolster its view. It
remains contentious. In January of 2011, The Rabbinic
Council of American, a union of Modern Orthodox
Rabbis declared that it would not lend its support to
either position but encouraged its members to make
their own decisions on which definitions fulfill the re-
quirements of Jewish law. Around the same time, one
rabbinate in the United Kingdom reversed earlier rulings
and rejected brain death criteria [21].
Withdrawal of mechanical support: Judaism
Withdrawing mechanical support at any point is at least
as controversial in the orthodox community as the cri-
teria used to define death. Even those who favor using
neurological criteria find it difficult to discontinue mech-
anical support, especially the ventilator, even though the
patient has met the criteria for brain death. They cite
Joseph Karo’s 16th century commentary [22],
Thus it is forbidden to cause the dying person to
die more quickly. For example if one is a goses
(moribund person) for a long time and is unable
to expire, it is forbidden to remove the pillows or
mattress from underneath him, . . . However, if
there is something causing a hindrance to the soul’s
departure, such as if there is a noise near the house
such as a woodchopper, or if there is salt on his tongue,
or these are delaying the departure of the soul, it is
permitted to remove them.– all medicine is obligatory
but if there is an impediment to dying it may be
removed.e (Italics added)
The argument is paradoxical, on the one hand, the pa-
tient has been determined dead by brain criteria but on
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clearly trumps brain death. Feinstein, who accepts
neurological criteria, sends a mixed signal when he spe-
cifically states that respirator should not be turned off
even if the person meets the criteria for brain death. He
notes that if a clinically dead patient is on a respirator,
“it is forbidden to interrupt the respirator.” He suggests
checking for signs of spontaneous respiration while ma-
chinery is being serviced and restarting the respirator if
there is any sign that breathing might occur [23]. Simi-
larly, Rabbi Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg notes that, “If
it is not clear whether the respirator is keeping the pa-
tient alive or only ventilating a corpse, the respirator
must be maintained” [24]. Turning it off to determine
whether there is breathing is not permitted because it
may cause the patient’s death “as the movement of a
flickering candle causes the flame to be extinguished.”
Waldenberg advocates using respirators on timers that
automatically turn off and then must be reset manually.
Observing the patient at this time will indicate whether
there is spontaneous breathing and will prevent the need
for medical personel to disconnect the equipment and
possibly engage in ‘an act of commission’ that he cannot
endorse [25].
There are occasional voices in the orthodox rabbinic
community who believe that the respirator and other
interventions may be discontinued. Rabbi David HaLevi
sees the maintainance of mechanical support, such as a
respirator in a dying patient as an impediment which
may be removed as the ‘salt on the tongue,’ [26]. Most in
the Orthodox community, however, see these interven-
tions as medical treatment and argue that they are
obligatory and must be continued despite the fact that
death has been determined using neurological criteria.
Most of orthodoxy agrees, however, that there is a
point at which treatment may be suspended, but they
disagree on when that point is. Bleich has a very restrict-
ive view and states that medical treatment, though usu-
ally obligatory, is not required if it is clear that a patient
is moribund (goses) and will die within 72 hours ([27],
p.141-142). He does not believe treatment should stop
under other circumstances regardless of the reason. He
notes that even the best intention does not matter; the
act of discontinuing treatment for anyone other than a
goses is still homicide ([28], p.260). Moshe Feinstein, in
basic agreement with Bleich on this issue, extends the
period of time during which it is appropriate to with-
draw treament to a few weeks. Feinstein is concerned,
however, that removing a ventilator might cause a pa-
tient’s death, so he urges caution, and recommends
reconnecting the ventilator if the patient appears to be
alive, so there will be no chance of contributing to his
death “. . . for even the slightest period of temporary life”
is valuable ([29], p.839).The Conservative tradition shares the perspective that
medical care is obligatory up to a point, but extends the
period of time in which treatment may be withheld or
withdrawn—up to a year or more. Permission to with-
hold or withdraw medicines is applied more broadly.g
The Conservative Movement’s Council on Jewish Law
and Standards has adopted new guidelines for stopping
treatment. Rabbi Elliott N. Dorff has successfully intro-
duced the category of terefah, which applies as soon as
someone receives a diagnosis of terminal, incurable ill-
ness. “Permission to withhold or withdraw medications
and machines” applies as soon as someone receives their
diagnosis [30].
While in Orthodox and Conservative Judaism, the de-
bate centers on when treatment may be terminated,
Reform Judaism focuses on the therapeutic effectiveness
of treatment. “Ineffective therapy ceases to be medicine”
and is not required. The decisions in this branch of
Judaism are left to the patient and family in consultation
with their pysician ([29], p.841).
Christianity
Christianity developed from the first century Jewish re-
form movement centered on Jesus. From these roots
Christianity inherits respect for scripture and authorita-
tive interpretation and brings both to the examination of
contemporary moral issues. As it moved throughout the
Roman Empire, Christianity borrowed key ideas from
Greek philosophy, especially Plato and Aristotle. Two as-
pects of Greek influence are important here: the Platonic
view that the human is comprised of two separate com-
ponents, body and soul, and the idea that the mind of
the individual is superior to the body.
A schism that began in the early eleventh century sep-
arated Christianity into two forms, now called Western
Christianity and Eastern Orthodoxy. Western Christianity
includes Roman Catholicism and the Protestant reform
movements that developed from it beginning in the early
sixteenth century. Eastern Christianity includes autono-
mous faith expressions such as Albanian, Coptic, Greek,
Romanian, and Russian Orthodoxy.
Roman Catholic Christianity
As the church grew in its first several centuries, it
quickly developed a hierarchical structure that differenti-
ates it from Judaism. Pronouncements on moral issues
come from the top of the church structure, the Papacy,
and though individuals might disagree, the pronounce-
ments have a key impact on what the Catholic laity
thinks. These pronouncements rely more on biblically
based moral theory rather than on analysis of past state-
ments of authoritative individuals.
A full decade before the Harvard Committee con-
vened, Pius XII, leader of the Church from 1939–1958,
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to answer questions raised by one of their members. In-
cluded in his response were the moral issues of defining
death and withdrawing mechanical support.
In a section titled “When is one ‘dead’? Pius XII makes
two key statements. He distinguished between the death
of the whole person and the death of organs.
But considerations of a general nature allow us to
believe that human life continues for as long as its
vital functions—distinguished from the simple life of
organs—manifest themselves spontaneously or even
with help of artificial processes [31].
He went on to note that:
It remains for the doctor, especially the anesthesiologist,
to. . . give a clear and precise definition of “death” and
the “moment of death” of a patient who passes away in a
state of unconsciousness [31].
These statements were later used to affirm the Catholic
position that neurological criteria, determined by the med-
ical community, were appropriate definitions of death. The
authors of the Harvard criteria drew on this statement in
their report.
John Paul II presided over Roman Catholicism from
1978 to 2005. In his writings and talks, he developed a
clear and consistent understanding of determining death
that followed from the statements of his predecessors.
In a 2000 address John Paul II noted that “death . . .
results from the separation of the life-principle (or soul)
from the corporal reality of the person,” acknowl-
edged that this was not observable, and affirmed the
use of medical criteria to identify “the biological signs
that a person has indeed died.” [32] (Italics in the
original).
In 2005, the Pontifical Academy of Sciences revisited
the issues. Two years later, it published its findings
under the title, “Why Brain Death is Valid as a Definition
of Death.” The document that resulted opened with the
following statement:
Brain death has been a highly important and useful
concept for clinical Medicine, but it continues to meet
with resistance in certain circles. The reasons for this
resistance pose questions for medical neurologists,
who are perhaps in the best position to clarify the
pitfalls of this controversial issue.
To achieve consistency, an important initial clarification
is that brain death is not a synonym for death, does
not imply death, or is not equal to death, but ‘is’
death. ([33], p.5)In this report the Academy noted that cardio-
pulmonary criteria had long been the standard for deter-
mining that death had occurred, but with the advent of
the ventilator and need for organs, medicine developed
new criteria. In discussing the Academy findings, John
Paul II delineates the Harvard Criteria and subsequent
emendations to it in an argument that affirms his ac-
ceptance of these criteria when strictly applied. He
clearly states that it is appropriate to turn to medical
authorities in order to assess the criteria and notes
that Harvard Brain Death Criteria (1968) and that the
Uniform Determination of Death Act are accepted by all
50 American States, the American Medical Academy and
the American Bar Association. Because Papal authority
carries significant weight, the roughly 600 Catholic hospi-
tals in the American medical system all adhere to neuro-
logical determination of death.
In the past few years, a few Roman Catholic writers
have taken issue with the use of neurological criteria
writing articles such as “Are Organ Transplants Ever
Morally Licit?,” “Brain Death is NOT Death,” and Finis
Vitae ([34], p.ix). They uniformly oppose the use of
neurological criteria and argue instead that cessation of
the cardio-pulmonary system is the only licit determin-
ation of death. “Neurological criteria are not sufficient
for declaration of death when an intact cardio-
respiratory system is functioning” [35]. Although this
view remains in the minority, it has recently attracted
more adherents, though many of those may be influ-
enced by erroneous and misleading statements made
in the Terri Schiavo case that she was brain dead
[36] and internet sources that make factually false
claims like the following, “‘Brain death’ or ‘death by
neurological criteria,” is common medical terminology
for patients who are said to be in an irreversible coma,
sometimes referred to as a ‘persistent vegetative state’
(PVS)” [37].
A recent article released by the Catholic News Agency
[38] addresses the concerns of the growing number of
opponents to the papal view by rehearsing the trad-
ition on the issue, reviewing the past decisions of the
papal authority, demonstrating the widespread agree-
ment with neurological criteria, and pointing out the
errors in the cases that are being used to undermine
the Church’s position by noting that in those instances
individuals either did not meet the criteria in any way
or faulty medical practice led to diagnostic errors. This
article insists that “death consists in the disintegration
of that unitary and integrated whole that is the per-
sonal self. It results from the separation of the life-
principle (or soul) from the corporal reality of the person.”
That disintegration, it argues, is completely evident in
the medical criteria used in the determination of brain
death [38].
Setta and Shemie Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine  (2015) 10:6 Page 7 of 22Withdrawal of mechanical support: Roman Catholicism
Because the official position of the Roman Catholic
Church firmly asserts that brain death is death, there is
no difficulty in ending the mechanical means that was
used to support the patient prior to the determination of
death.
The Church uses guidelines to assist in deciding when
withdrawing support prior to determining death is a
morally fitting decision. To assess the appropriateness of
an action in a complex moral situation such as withhold-
ing or stopping treatment, Roman Catholicism draws on
an ethical system developed by thirteenth century theo-
logian, Thomas Aquinas, and a 16th century lecture on
stopping treatment by Francisco diVittoria. Both men
provide a method for ethical analysis.
Aquinas’ schematic, called Natural Law, is used to de-
termine how to act morally when both a good and evil
consequence might arise from a single action. Four cri-
teria must be met for an action to be considered moral.
First, the action must arise from a good will, second,
there must be a proportion of good over evil arising
from the action, third, the evil may not be directly
intended, and finally the evil must not be the means of
producing the good. Administering a drug that will pro-
vide pain relief to a terminally ill patient (the good) but
will also depress the respiratory system and hasten death
(the evil) exemplifies double effect. Giving the drug can
be considered acceptable if the action is intended to
benefit the patient, the lessening of suffering is sufficient
to outweigh the shortening of life, the death is not dir-
ectly intended and the patient is not killed in order to
end suffering.
In addition to Natural Law, Roman Catholic med-
ical ethics make use of several principles Francisco
DiVittoria set out in his discussion of end of life is-
sues. DiVittorio asked, “What means shall be taken
to prolong life when one suffers from a fatal disease?” To
this he answers that only those treatments that prolong
life for a significant amount of time and do not cause a
grave burden for the patient are required. He developed
the categories of ordinary and extraordinary means [39].
Ordinary means will prolong a patient’s life and are re-
quired; extra-ordinary means, in contrast, prolong death
and may be discontinued.
In his 1957 address Pius XII referred to both Natural
Law and extraordinary means in his discussion of when
treatment can be withdrawn. Following Aquinas, he ad-
vises decisions based on the proportion of good over evil
in direct relation to the particular circumstances of the
individual. Extra-ordinary means, in the face of an incur-
able illness, are not required. The resulting death from
the interruption of mechanical means would be an indir-
ect cause and would satisfy the criteria of “the principle
of double effect” [31].Statements by John Paul II reiterated these standards
of care in his 1980 statement, “Euthanasia” and dis-
cussed the terms ordinary and extra-ordinary means
which he stated had become unclear because the same
treatment, a ventilator, for example, would be considered
ordinary in one circumstance and extra-ordinary in an-
other. Instead, he uses only the terms proportionate and
disproportionate means which can be determined by
analyzing particular cases and the types of treatments,
costs, physical and moral resources of the patient. He
states, “it is permitted, with the patient’s consent, to
interrupt these means” [40].
Because of the hierarchical system of Roman Catholicism,
statements of the papal authority have significant
weight in the Catholic Health Care system. There is
one set of directives, for example, for all Catholic
health care facilities in the United States. Regulation 33
states, “The well-being of the whole person must be
taken into account in deciding about any therapeutic
intervention or use of technology Therapeutic proce-
dures that are likely to cause harm can be justified only
by a proportionate benefit to the patient [41]. This in-
cludes withdrawing enteral or parenteral nutrition in a
patient who is dying, but not from someone in a per-
sistent vegetative state.”
Eastern Orthodox Christianity
The schism that divided Christianity into two main fac-
tions began in 1054 over issues that are not germane to
this discussion. Contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy differ-
entiates itself from Roman Catholicism in several ways,
two are important for the moral issues discussed here.
Eastern Orthodoxy does not recognize the Roman Catholic
Pope as the supreme authority over all of Christendom.
Eastern Orthodoxy is organized into autonomous regional
churches. Each regional Church has its own governing
body which results in differences across the tradition in a
variety of areas including some medical ethical issues.
Though it is hierarchical, Orthodox Christianity sometimes
cedes the decision making in ethical dilemmas to the indi-
viduals in consultation with their spiritual fathers. The
decision to use non-abortive contraception, which the
Church generally opposes, is left to individuals in consult-
ation with their spiritual father.
Although Eastern Orthodoxy still shares a concern
for basing morality on the Bible and authoritative inter-
pretations from the Church Fathers with its Roman
counterparts, it does not accept the traditions that
developed in Rome after the split. This includes the de-
velopment of moral theory that began with Thomas
Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Eastern Orthodoxy
does not believe that moral issues can be understood
through either the processes of reason or the use of
philosophical analysis.
Setta and Shemie Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine  (2015) 10:6 Page 8 of 22Writing about moral decision making, Orthodox Priest,
Dimitri Cozby, notes that “many issues in this fallen world
do not resolve readily into a choice between right and
wrong but rather engage us in a struggle to discern the
least harmful among various evils.” He goes on to note
that “in the Orthodox view, the Fall has corrupted man’s
intellect, affecting his ability both to perceive the real-
ities of this world and to deal rationally with those real-
ities.” [42] Because human reason is flawed, Orthodox
Christianity, does not have as Tristam Englehardt,
philosopher, physician, and convert to this tradition
puts it, “moral theology or a moral philosophy” but relies
instead on “knowledge born of prayer and illumination by
the personal God” [43]. Priest and ethicist Stanley Harakas
writes that moral judgments must proceed from harmony
with the “mind of the church,” but acknowledges that
occasional differences in Orthodox writings on ethics do
occur because human reason is flawed [44].
Greek Orthodox bioethicist, John Breck describes what
is necessary to do ethics. He says “a scriptural mind”
and “a patristic mind” are requisite” and that means “we
have to become so steeped in the tradition of our church
that our thinking naturally takes its contours.”h The ethi-
cist, priest and layperson all can, in Breck’s view, acquire
the “mind of the church through knowledge of Holy
Scripture and Holy Tradition” [45]. Philosophical ethics
are not sufficient to handle of complex ethical issues be-
cause the human mind does not have the requisite
knowledge to determine what the consequences of an
action will be. That knowledge can only be gained
through prayer and the study of scripture and the Church
Fathers [44].
Orthodoxy finds the Roman Catholic’s concepts of the
principle of double effect and ordinary and extraordinary
means to be at times useful but sees that these cannot
solve every moral issue. Breck uses the example of a
physician treating a terminally ill patient who has
assented to a plan to alleviate suffering in a way that will
hasten death, Breck notes that by using the principle of
double intent, this action would be permissible, because
the evil (here the death of the patient) is not technically
intended. He believes, however, that it is unreasonable
to expect that the doctor will be able to suppress the
underlying desire that the patient die so that suffering
is permanently relieved; hence the intent actually is to
end the life of the patient. Breck along with other
Orthodox ethicists believe it morally acceptable to
lessen suffering even if the method brings an earlier
death when it is done for the benefit of the patient;
their disagreement is with the method of arriving at
this conclusion [45].
Some writing on behalf of their Church fully accept
the idea of brain death. Russian Orthodox Christianity,
for one, considers cardio-pulmonary cessation to be aclear indication of death, and goes on to note that the
improvement in intensive care technologies “has posed
the problem of the verification of the moment of death.”
The official pronouncement of the Moscow Patriarchate,
Bases (sic) of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox
Church, notes that new technologies can artificially
support organs for a long time, even though the patient
is dead. This branch of Orthodoxy cedes the decision
of determining death to the physician acknowledging
that “this places a qualitatively new responsibility on
contemporary medicine” [46]. This branch of Orthodoxy
does not take any position on what criteria the physician
should use.
Two views present themselves from the Greek Orthodox
Church. John Breck finds the medical criteria helpful but
not definitive: “If the cerebrum, including the cortex, is
permanently destroyed, then we can say that personal
identity is lost. While the soul is the life principle of
the entire organism, death of the cerebrum indicates
that the soul, in liturgical language, has ‘left the body’
and the person as such is dead”. But this writer cau-
tions, “answers regarding appropriate treatment are not
written on the wall”. The only way to make a moral de-
cision is through ceaseless intercession and offering the
patient to God, “asking for both clarity and charity” in
making these decisions [45].
Nikolaos Hatzinikolaou of the Hellenic Center for
Biomedical Ethics in Athens, points out that “death can
be generally described but not exactly defined, “because
along with a biological event it implies an unknown
mystery, hence, he adds that “the Orthodox Christian
Church avoids clear-cut statements that identify death
with the cessation of the brain, cardiac or any other
function” [47]. Despite his disagreement with basing
determinations of death exclusively on medical criteria,
Hatzinikolaou goes on to state:
It seems that brain death will remain open to
discussion. However, from a spiritual point of
view, this does not create any ethical problems to
transplantations. It may be even better for it
makes us transcend the scholastic certainty of a
clear-cut definition of death and introduces us to
the uncertainty of a risky decision. Love cannot be
expressed without taking risks! [47]
Though it does not deal specifically with issues of end-
of-life issues, the Coptic Orthodox Church states that it
“does not have (and actually refuses to canonize) an
official position vis-à-vis some controversial issues (e.g.
abortion). While the church has clear teachings about
such matters (e.g. abortion interferes with God's will), it
is the position of the Church that such matters are bet-
ter resolved on a case-by-case basis by the father of
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makes a sin of such practices” [48].
These views are unified in their overarching position
that each moral issues must be looked at individually.
Indeed, Orthodox moral reasoning can turn to the
principle of Economia, which allows flexibility where
there is a clear cut pronouncement that does not seem
to be the right decision in the case at hand. Economia in
canon law and in ethics authorizes exceptions to the rule
without considering the exception either to set a prece-
dent or to abrogate the rule. The justification for apply-
ing Economia is avoidance of the greater harm that
would come from the strict application of the rule.
Withdrawal of mechanical support: Eastern Orthodox
Christianity
Orthodox Catholicism, like its Roman counterpart, ac-
cepts the withdrawal of life support systems for those
who are dying and quotes the Roman Catholic position
on withdrawing treatment. Breck states that “withholding
or withdrawing life support conforms thoroughly both
to the Hippocratic Oath and to the will of God as we
know it from Scripture and the tradition of the Church”
because it allows the patient to complete life with peace
and dignity. He goes so far as to say that in some situa-
tions withdrawing treatment is obligatory ([45]: 143).
Hatzinikolaou agrees because “hope in the resurrection
is incomparably superior to the desperate struggle for
the prolongation of earthly life” ([47]:191).
Protestant Christianities
Protestantism entered the world religious scene in 1517
when Martin Luther (1483–1546) posted his 95 theses
on the door of the Wittenberg Cathedral. Two core
principles of this Protestant Reformation were the
priesthood of all believers and Sola Scriptura, ideas
which form the core of many contemporary forms of
Protestantism. The term, priesthood of all believers,
refers to the belief that there is no separate ethic, re-
sponsibility, or ability among the believers, clergy or
laity, to make moral determinations and it includes the
notion that individuals are responsible for turning only to
scripture and not to authority to ascertain the morality
of an action. The result of Sola Scriptura is that most
Protestants will not automatically turn to authoritative
figures from the past to make determinations though
they certainly consult them. It is just as likely that they
will turn to present day religious leaders, science, medi-
cine, or philosophical ethics to inform their moral views
when Scripture provides no clear guideline.
In contrast to the Protestant Reformation, the English
Reformation which began during the reign of Henry VIII
(1491–1547) started as a political dispute in 1529 with
religious reforms following especially under Henry’s sonEdward VI. The contemporary Anglican Communion
bases its decisions on reason, scripture and tradition.
The focus on individual authority in both Reformations
quickly led to the splitting of the original reform move-
ments into new forms of Christianity; Anabaptist move-
ments in Germany formed within a decade of Luther’s
pronouncements; by the beginning of the 17th the Baptist
tradition began among English emigrés living in Holland.
The divisions continued; the result is minimally hundreds
of variations of Protestant Christianity with new forms
regularly emerging.
Many forms of Protestantism do not have official
statements on the appropriate criteria to use in making
a determination of death.i This includes American
Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-Day Adventists,
Southern Baptist Convention, United Methodists, Unitarian
Universalist Association, and the United Church of Christ.j
All of these groups explicitly, though briefly, state that
they do support living and cadaver donationsk and find
the withdrawal of mechanical means to be appropriate. For
example, the 1992 resolution on Euthanasia from the
Southern Baptist Convention states: “Most Christians be-
lieve it is morally and biblically acceptable for patients to
refuse or withdraw medical treatment when death is
imminent and do not categorize such practice as euthan-
asia or ‘mercy killing.’” This resolution prohibits the with-
drawal of artificial hydration and nutrition [49].
Lutheran, Anglican, Presbyterians and churches be-
longing to the National Association of Evangelicals in
Americal have more substantial writings on these issues
than do the groups listed above.
The Lutheran churches
The Lutheran tradition comes directly from the reforma-
tion in Germany. Today, it is organized into autonomous
regional churches. It holds firmly to the original princi-
ples of the priesthood of all believers and Sola Scriptura.
Statements on social/ethical issues produced by the
regional groups reflect this since they are designed “to edu-
cate and guide members” as they form their own judg-
ments [50]. In 1979, the Lutheran Church Missouri-Synod
Report on Euthanasia with Guiding Principles found the
“criterion of brain death to” to have “contributed to a more
constructive discussion” on determining death because
earlier definitions of death that focused on “circulation of
blood and stoppage of animal functions” did not duly sep-
arate humans from the animal kingdom [51].
Similarly, in 1983, Daniel Lee wrote a study guide to
accompany the Lutheran Church in America’sm state-
ment, Death and Dying. Lee wrote,
The whole or total brain definition has the most to
recommend it. Unlike the upper or higher brain
definition it does not reduce the concept of death to
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social sensitivities in the way that the upper or higher
brain death definitions does. Unlike the spontaneous
heart-lung definition it does not run the risk of
declaring death when consciousness is still possible.
And unlike the more inclusive heart-lung definition, it
does not by implication extend the definition of human
life beyond the point where integrated functioning of
the organism as a whole is possible [52].
The church also publishes works by individual authors
that are designed to foment discussion. The website of
the Wisconsin Synod, for example features an article on
brain death by Lutheran pastor, James Pope, who re-
sponds to a question regarding the validity of the con-
cept of brain death. Pope does not see brain death as
death. He writes, “if there truly was brain death, the
body would not be cycling and processing the oxygen re-
ceived through the ventilator. The body would not be
staying warm”. Then, Pope refers the questioner to an-
other website that argues that brain death is death [53].
Withdrawal of mechanical support: Lutheran
All branches of the Lutheran tradition support the right
of the individual to make their own decisions which can
include withdrawing mechanical support. In 1992 the
ECLA wrote that “Patients have a right to refuse unduly
burdensome treatments” and though the patient should
be the primary decision maker, others directly in-
volved can step in if the person is incapacitated [54].
The Lutheran Church Missouri-Synod agrees that sup-
port can be withdrawn but cedes the decision making to
physicians [51].
The Anglican communion
Mid-sixteenth century reforms to the Christian Church
in England distinguished it from the church in Rome.
Theologian, Richard Hooker, (1554–1600) formulated
the view that Scripture, reason and tradition were the
legitimate basis for theological and ethical judgments.
Provinces and national churches of the Anglican com-
munity throughout the world are connected to the
Church of England through ecclesiastical structures.
Scripture is a key source for ethical analysis, including
bio-ethics, and is used in conjunction with tradition, sci-
ence and philosophical ethics. There are variations
across the Anglican Communion on a number of ethical
issues. On the two issues under study here, however,
there is considerable agreement.
A study guide that was prepared in 1998 for a Canadian
task force on end of life issues does not discuss the criteria
for death in any detail, but does define it. The study mate-
rials that were distributed prior to the final report included
the following: “the term brain death relates to the clinicalcriteria developed to determine that death had occurred in
patients on life support. Such patients are dead, and the
removal of ‘life support’ simply acknowledges this” [55].
In 2000 the Standing Commission on Human Affairs
and Health created an End-of-Life Task Force that pub-
lished a report and later a book [56]. Neither specifically
address the issues centering on the criteria for determin-
ing death, but in the section on organ donation, it is
clear that the task force agreed with medical criteria for
determining death and strongly advised its members to
consider living and cadaver organ donation [57].
Similar definitions appear in materials that are being
distributed for the next end-of-life task force of death
and dying that was formed in October, 2014. Proposed
and actual changes to laws regarding physician assisted
suicide are among societal factors leading to the need
for a new task force. To prepare for the new examina-
tions of the issues, Anglican ethicist, Eric Beresford, has
prepared materials for the group that include papers on
both sides of the issue and response forms participants
are to answer after deliberating over the issues.
Withdrawal of mechanical support: Anglican
While clear definitions of death are hard to find in offi-
cial publications, support for the withdrawal of mechan-
ical support is clearly stated in both study guides and
publications. Artificial hydration and nutrition are in-
cluded in the medical interventions which can be with-
drawn. Acknowledging that withdrawing treatment may
be an agonizing decision for families, various Anglican
writings uphold the right of the individual and family to
make decisions in these cases and the Church provides
resources to their congregants to support those making
difficult moral decisions about the use of medical treat-
ment [57].
Presbyterian churches - USA
Presbyterian beliefs and practices are rooted in the
theology of John Calvin (1509–1564) who saw under-
standing Scripture as central to Christian life. In this
tradition, individuals are responsible for cultivating their
own spirituality through study and reflection. The
Church supports this by providing resources to help in-
dividuals understand and assess complex moral situa-
tions. Members may find statements issued by the
governing body, the General Assembly, helpful, but they
are not binding. In 1995 The Congregational Ministries
Division produced a study guide In Life and Death We
Belong to God: Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide, and End-
of-Life Issues, for its members and congregations. It
contains reflections on scripture relating to death and
dying, articles from philosophical ethics, and an exten-
sive bibliography. This manual states that the definition
of death arising from the Harvard ad hoc Committees
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objective standard by which to determine death and
has been adopted into legislative statues and hospital
policies” [58].
Withdrawal of mechanical support: Presbyterian
In 1988 the General Assembly produced a position
paper dealing specifically with questions about with-
drawing support. This document begins with a scriptural
exploration and notes that while the Bible does not give
specific instructions it does “offer principles which can
and must guide decisionmaking (sic).” These principles
include attempting to know the “mind of Christ” which
“must be informed by Biblical principles as well as med-
ical facts.” Acknowledging that no one rule can govern
every end-of-life moral dilemma, the paper states that:
“Ethical choices may become more clearly evident if
the goals of medical care in these situations are, first,
to heal or restore and, second, to relieve suffering. It
is not the goal of medicine simply to prevent death.
Thus, the goal of medical care to relieve suffering
remains clear even when healing or restoration is not
a realistic hope. This goal is likely to prevent the use
of technology that prolongs death and often increases
the suffering of the patient” [59].
National association of Evangelicals in America
Roughly fifty denominations and fellowships belong to this
association. They include a number Baptist, Lutheran,
Methodist, and Pentecostal expressions that have not
joined with the national associations. The Association has
created a brief statement dealing with determining death.
It notes:
The National Association of evangelicals believes that
in cases where extensive brain injury has occurred
and there is clear medical indication that the patient
has suffered brain death (permanent unconscious state),
no medical treatment can reverse the process [60].
In the further discussion, however, it makes the follow-
ing statement:
Brain death is not the equivalent of a coma. A patient
might awaken from a coma, but not from brain death.
Removal of any extraordinary life-support system at
this time is morally appropriate and allows the dying
process to proceed [60].
Like writings found in a few other groups, this short
treatise argues on the one hand that brain death is death
but then adds that withdrawing “life support” allows the
dying process to proceed.Withdrawal of mechanical support before death has been
determined: national association of Evangelicals
In its statement on Euthanasia, the National Association
sees the withdrawal of life-support systems to be appro-
priate when this treatment serves “only to prolong the
dying process” [60].
Islam
Islam appeared on the religious scene in the seventh
century through a series of prophetic visions received by
Muhammad and eventually codified in the Qur’an. Islam
traces its roots to Abraham and accepts that Moses and
Jesus were prophets. However Muhammad is understood
to be the final prophet and the Qur'an the final revelation
of God.n In Islam, God created humans from a single nafs
(soul or spirit) (7:189) and are variously described as one
unified being, or a dualistic being made up of two compo-
nents, body and soul. That Islam is rooted in both Jewish
and Christian thought and influenced by Greek philosophy
is clear from these competing and often unclear views.
To determine the morality of action, Islam draws first
on the Qur’an and Sunnaho (actions and sayings of the
Muhammad as recorded in the Hadith). These Islamic
texts spend considerable time talking about death and
afterlife, but not the criteria for declaring death. Conse-
quently, contemporary moral discussion will also include
interpretation of previous sources to determine what is
morally fitting, halal, and conforms to the Islamic moral
and legal code, shari’a. If texts are silent on an issue,
Islamic jurists create fiqh, legal interpretations, using prin-
ciples such as the dominant probability of good or harm
resulting from an act and potential societal benefit to make
ethical decisions ([61], p.317). As in Judaism, the interpre-
tations of text and rational arguments can vary widely since
there is no one person who is vested with interpretation
for the group as a whole. On occasion, when national
councils are tasked with determining the morality of a con-
temporary moral issue, those who dissent will simply con-
vene a new council and produce an alternative ruling.
Before the advent of mechanical life support measures,
there was no disagreement between physicians and
clerics about the definition of death. Because of Islam’s
profound respect for medicine and science, believed to
be mandated by the Qur’an, clerics deferred to physi-
cians on bioethical issues. Hence, Muslim physicians
have served a key role in applying tradition to develop-
ing medical situations. When physicians wrote in sup-
port of brain death, they relied on two Islamic traditions.
The first was as an ancient ruling that if the king can no
longer use his mind, a new king can be crowned. Since
only a deceased king can be replaced, this ruling is used
to justify applying brain death criteria to a potential
donor. The second, more common discussion, looks to
rules hunters use to determine whether an animal is dying
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Islam requires that it be slaughtered in a specific, ritual
way. If a hunted animal dies before the ritual slaughter
then its meat is not halal and cannot be eaten. Because the
Qur’an considers a decapitated animal to be dead, it cannot
be ritually slaughtered and cannot be eaten. This idea is
then applied to the determination of death in humans to
argue that brain death is an appropriate vehicle for asses-
sing that death has occurred ([62], p.152-153).
While there is widespread support from Islamic physi-
cians for using neurological criteria, religious scholars
overwhelmingly dispute it.
Beginning in the 1980’s, several Muslim philosophers
began attempting to define life as embodied conscious-
ness, a definition they then used to justify using neuro-
logical criteria as an indication that consciousness has
left the body, which, they believe, coincides with brain
death ([5], p.19). Most Muslim jurists, however, believe
this cannot be ascertained medically and as a result find
cardio-respiratory death the only suitable determination
([62], p.163). Jordanian jurist Muhammad Na’im Yasin
dissents from the typical clerical view. He does not be-
lieve any textual ordinance is supported by the Qur’an
or Sunnah so brain death is not regulated by any legal
precedent. He cedes to physicians the ability to make de-
terminations and argues that the medical evidence for
brain death shows a “dominant probability” that the pa-
tient has entered the “phase of death.” He argues that
the “human soul in its presence or absence remains
linked to the brain” ([63], p.317-318). For the most part,
however, opinions throughout the Muslim world fall into
the three categories: those who oppose neurological cri-
teria, those who accept them, and a third group that
technically accepts neurological criteria while acting in a
way that belies acceptance of those criteria. A summary
of recent judicial decisions exemplifies the varied views.
In Amman (1985), Islamic scholars and medical ex-
perts attempted to come to agreement on the criteria for
determining death. No resolution was reached during
the first session. The next year the group produced its
“Resolution of the Council of Islamic Jurisprudence on
Resuscitation Apparatus, Amman, 1986.” The resolution
reads as most do in Islamic nations. It has provisions for
both brain death and cardio-respiratory death satisfying
both the clerics and scientists.
A person is pronounced legally dead and consequently,
all dispositions of the Islamic law in case of death
apply if one of the two following conditions has been
established:
1. There is total cessation of cardiac and respiratory
functions, and doctors have ruled that such
cessation is irreversible.2. There is total cessation of all cerebral functions and
experienced specialized doctors have ruled that such
cessation is irreversible and the brain has started to
disintegrate [63].
In Kuwait, two councils on jurisprudence produced
opposite conclusions within a short period of time – one
arguing that the presence of a heartbeat always indicated
that the patient was alive, one claiming neurological cri-
teria trumped the beating heart ([5], p.20). The Ayatollah
Khomeini, spiritual leader of Iran, pronounced as mor-
ally acceptable the use of brain death criteria only to
have that rejected by Iranian Islamic jurists ([62], p.164).
Perhaps the most conflicted ruling comes from the
Islamic Juridical Council who determined that an indi-
vidual who met the neurological criteria for brain death
was biologically dead but only became legally dead when
artificially supported breathing breathing stops com-
pletely ([62], p265-266).p
Several scholars contend that confusion results be-
cause in the past physicians and governments acted as
primary decision makers in medical situations and “. . .
the necessary debate involving religious and legal commu-
nities on the issue of when to call patients dead” had not
occurred [64]. In the early stages of the debate, Islamic ju-
rists deferred to physicians and generally did not present
arguments based on Islamic understanding of either the
nature of the human being or on criteria used to determine
that death had occurred. Omar Haque contends that the
disconnection between “the popular and religious senti-
ment and emerging scientific practice among physicians”
([5], p.3) has its roots in this deference and lack of educa-
tion about the issues public debate would engender.
What appears to be the case in Islam is similar to
Christianity, namely there is only partial understanding
of the actual criteria. In one survey of fifty Islamic ju-
rists, 90% indicated that they did not agree that brain
death equaled death. After an explanation of the criteria
used, seven emended their view to indicate the appropri-
ateness of brain death ([5], p.28). In this situation, when
some individuals were better informed on the details of
brain death and its differentiation from conditions such
as persistent vegetative state, they were more inclined to
accept neurological criteria.
Withdrawal of mechanical support before death has been
determined: Islam
Though the issue of how to determine if someone has
died remains contentious, there is little disagreement on
withdrawing futile treatment. The physician and family
are charged with making this decision. Factors that can
be considered include the benefit to be derived from the
treatment, the burden to the patient and the burden to
the family.
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Also called aboriginal, primal or archaic (from the Greek
arché, original) religions, indigenous traditions are found
throughout the contemporary world from the North
American Cherokee to the Ghanaian Ashanti and every-
where in between. Although each form has unique as-
pects, these traditions share features that cut across
regional boundaries. These include an animistic world
view, concern for universal harmony, centeredness in
nature and place, and right practice.
Animistic traditions have several features that have
bearing on the discussion at hand. In Animism, humans
have both a physical and a spiritual component. At
death, the spirit, often called an ancestor, will both abide
in another world and be present in this one. Respect for
those who have died is a hallmark of these traditions;
some include ancestor worship. Seeing themselves as
part of a whole living world, indigenous traditions often
value the land and place. Sacred rocks, mountains and
religious artifacts made of clay and stone connect people
to the land. The correct enactment of life stage rituals
protects the entire community and keeps evil forces at
bay. Disruption to harmony can arise from an individual
breaking a taboo–whether intended or not–or from im-
proper ritual performance. The orientation and goal of
moral reasoning in these traditions is maintaining har-
mony. Stories about the ancestors and listening to their
voices and those of spirit beings and animal helpers pro-
vide the moral framework for decision-making [65].
Often, the entire community involves itself in determin-
ing how to act. At other times, community elders will
decide for the group. Each moral decision is seen to
affect the entire community. Failure to follow the proper
procedures in caring for the dead, for example, will bring
harm to the deceased and the community.
For most indigenous traditions including those in
China and Japan which are discussed below, mentioning
death is taboo; a common view is that talking about
death will invite it [66]. Most indigenous groups share a
focus on the taboos, proper rituals and the location of
death, which should be outdoors, on the ground or in a
specially constructed hut. Indigenous people around the
world have resisted medical intervention in death. This
is especially true in areas where there is a “culture of
colonization,” that has produced suspicion and outright
mistrust of institutions and their bureaucracies. . .“In
addition, the culture heritage of nature based healing
sometimes conflicts with biomedical interventions and
technological solutions to health problems [67]. qThese
reasons, combined with a desire to choose the location
of death has several implications for understanding indi-
genous attitudes toward death. First, very little informa-
tion is available because of a reluctance both to discuss
death in general and to “talk about it with non-Indians”([68], p.177). Second, the desire to die in a specific
location–at home or outdoors, for example, means that
hospital deaths are often avoided. For some groups, the
place where death occurs becomes dangerous and com-
munity members will avoid it for varying periods of time
making hospital deaths particularly problematic. Third is
the view that medical intervention at death should be
limited ([69], p.121).
Withdrawal of mechanical support before death has been
determined: Indigenous traditions
Attitudes toward withdrawing mechanical support in
China and Japan are discussed below. In the Americas
and Australia there is information from a variety of indi-
genous expressions [70] that does point to reluctance to
accept medical treatment at the end of life and a desire
to die in the home area [71]. These two factors can be
related especially when the reservation is located at
some distance from medical facilities; dying in hospital
would remove the individual from their community sup-
port system. In addition, a typical, though not universal
view, is that individuals should die in the land where
they are born, otherwise their spirit will wander aim-
lessly ([72], p. 429). One subject of an interview com-
mented that when they are dying, “people should go
home. Because their spirit will be lost, yeah, looking for
home.”r ([73], p. 264–268).
Eastern religions
Eastern Religions include Hinduism, many varieties of
Buddhism as well as Confucianism and Taoism found in
China and Japan. Many Eastern religions are layered
onto pre-existing, indigenous traditions.
Hinduism
Hinduism is the name Persians and Greeks gave to the
grouping of religions found in India and presents itself
in varieties that have regional and cultural differences. In
general, Hinduism believes the current body is not the
true self—rather the body is like a coat that is shed when
it wears out. Underneath the coat is the self, Atman,
which moves from life to life. The actions you do in this
life, Karma, will determine the form that your body takes
in the next life. The ultimate goal is to gain permanent
release, moksha, from the cycle of death and rebirth and
experience oneness with Brahman (God). Intermediate
goals vary from group to group but many include pos-
sible existence in paradise which, though temporary, will
be blissful, or birth in a better life station which will in-
crease the chance of gaining permanent release.
Hinduism characterizes itself as a way of life rather
than as one religious tradition and centers on practice,
specifically doing what is right, or dharma. To assess the
correct action in a moral issue, Hindus will consult
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and consider their duty as it applies to their gender,
caste and life station. The overriding issue that deter-
mines what action to follow is the goal of moksha, liber-
ation from the cycle of death and rebirth ([73], p.162).
When dealing with issues regarding death, however,
many Hindus are uncomfortable with medical determi-
nations of death [74]. Although India passed a resolution
in 1994 that included provisions accepting brain death
criteria, and several sources state that Hindus accept
neurological criteria [75], internet and library searches
turn up few discussions of the issues surrounding med-
ical definitions of death. Instead discourse on death typ-
ically focuses on what constitutes a good or bad death in
religious and next life terms. A good death, essential for
both the dying person and the family, occurs when the
individual is properly prepared to die, the astrological
signs are right, and the proper rituals are performed.
Experiencing either liberation or a good rebirth re-
quires a good death. A bad death will have permanent
ramifications in subsequent lives; the deceased may be
reborn in a lesser station or wander unable to be re-
born but not liberated. There will be unfortunate con-
sequences for the family–e.g., bad luck, nightmares
and infertility—whose members will have to perform
retributive rituals for years to offset the bad death.
Sudden death, death with excessive bodily fluids, or a
death accompanied by poorly performed rituals consti-
tutes bad death ([76], p.683).
The place of death also matters. Dying in the holy city
of Benares near the Ganges is preferred, but if that is
not possible individuals will be lowered to the floor to
avoid the area between the ceiling and floor which is
filled with turmoil.s Water from the Ganges is some-
times placed under the patient and is usually given by
mouth. The focus of the individual must remain on a re-
ligious thought ([77], p.117), because “The dying should
always remember that the place where one will reincar-
nate is the place that he is thinking about prior to death”
[78]. Some people chant the name of their deity, others
chant passages from the Bhagavad Gita, and family
members place a light near the head of their loved one.
Interrupting this process can have consequences that
will continue eternally since it will affect all future
births.
Most people do not die in hospital in India; rather they
are sent home when death approaches ([79], p0132).
This tradition, along with Hinduism’s focus on right
practice, contribute to the scarcity of religious discussion
about issues such as determining death.
In a study of Hindu immigrants to North America,
Kyoko Murato outlines the adaptations the community
has made to death rituals. In North America, people do
die in hospitals and the Hindu community has adjustedto that. Murato also notes that in urban areas in India,
there are gradual changes in practice ([79], p125). Water
from the Ganges is brought to the hospital room and
the practice of moving the patient to the floor is
abandoned.
Withdrawing treatment before death has been determined:
Hinduism
Hindu concern for both interfering with the timing of
death and allowing the individual to focus correctly
shows itself directly in attitudes toward suspending
treatment, especially mechanical means of life support.
Twentieth century saint and spiritual master, Sivaya Sub-
ramuniysawami (Gurudeva) (1927–2001) notes:
To make heroic medical attempts that interfere with
the process of the patient’s departure is a grave
responsibility, similar to not letting a traveler board a
plane flight he has a reservation for, to keep him
stranded in the airport with a profusion of tears and
useless conversation. To prolong life in the debilitated
physical body past the point that the natural will of
the person has sustained is to incarcerate, to jail, to
place that person in prison. The prison is the hospital.
The guards are the life-support machines and the
tranquilizing drugs [80].
This attitude is shared by Hindu people living in India
and those who have migrated to new lands; families will
attempt to avoid artificial life support or terminate it as
soon as its futility is evident. Moreover, suspending arti-
ficial nutrition and hydration is sometimes supported
because there will be fewer bodily fluids and the soul
can more easily leave the body.
Buddhism
Founded in the 6th century b.c.e by Siddhartha Gautama,
Buddhism is the largest of several religions that appeared
in India at that time. It quickly became popular, moved
throughout Asia and was able to meld itself to the pre-
existing cultures of the locations in which it found itself.
For example, Buddhism is practiced alongside indigenous
traditions, such as feng-shui in China and Shinto in Japan,
and earlier formal religious and philosophical systems,
Confucianism and Taoism. Like Hinduism, Buddhism be-
lieves in the cycle of death and rebirth, samsara,and prof-
fers a way to liberation, Nirvana. There are two main
types of Buddhism, Theravada and Mahayana; there are
only slight variations between these two groups on the is-
sues of determining death.
Key sources for ethical guidance include the Buddha
whose life embodied truth and the ability to be liberated
from the cycle of births, samsara, the Buddha’s teaching,
Dhamma, and the community of advanced practitioners,
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guidance in making moral decisions, but they are not obli-
gated to follow their advice. Some forms of Buddhism
have a key figure such as the Dalai Lama, but there are
few authoritarian pronouncements that must be observed
by all followers since the Buddha emphasized the necessity
of finding one’s own path.
In Buddhism, death is distinguished from life by the
absence of three things, vitality, heat and consciousness.
Two western Buddhist scholars, one traditional physician-
monk from Thailand, and the president of the lay
Buddhist group, Soka Gakkai International, are the only
Buddhists who have argued publically that brain death
criteria are consistent with the Buddhist understanding
of death. Scholar Damien Keown, saw the category of
vitality and heat corresponding to bodily metabolic pro-
cesses that generate heat and claimed that Buddhist
texts support the idea that the brain is the source of in-
tegrating consciousness.t Soka Gakkai president Daisaku
Ikeda, has written that brain death appears to meet the cri-
teria for death in Buddhism, but true to Buddhist form, he
indicates that individuals have to come to own conclusions
([81], p.61).
Keown has, however, recently changed his view and
now agrees with most of Buddhism that the loss of bod-
ily heat is the only reliable indicator of death ([3], p.9).
Keown and others argue that consciousness, called “the
subtle body” continues to exist in a person whose heart
and respiration have stopped [4].u Tibetan Buddhists
claim that it takes a minimum of three days for the
subtle body to depart [82-84]. Adherents to Pure Land
Buddhism of China and Japan believe this happens over
a period of twelve to twenty-four hours. Scientific tests
are not adequate, most Buddhists argue, “because they
may not be able to detect existing states of conscious-
ness which may be in the [non-beating] heart, preparing
for death” ([85], p.306). Disrupting the body prior to
actual death will interfere with rebirth or attaining
release from samsara. For Buddhism, the ideal death oc-
curs “when there is no anxiety and the person is in a
conscious, calm, uplifted state” ([85], p.292).v
A brief look at Buddhism in several locations illus-
trates how these general features operate and how they
merge with other religions.
Chinese traditions
In China, Buddhism is present alongside indigenous
practices such as devotion to ancestors, and the philo-
sophical/ethical systems of Confucianism, and Taoism.
Buddhism arrived in China in the first century c.e. and
by the eighth century had its own distinctive forms
called Pure Land and Chan (Zen in Japan). Pure Land
Buddhism is the most popular form of Buddhism in
China; adherents are devoted to a Buddha called,Amitabha, who presides over a heavenly place called the
Pure Land. People who believe in him pray to him and
meditate on him so that they will join him in his para-
dise when they die. The Pure Land is a desirable spot
described as a fragrant paradise with hundreds of thou-
sands of colors. It is filled with precious things. When
people arrive, they can do whatever they want [83].w
Chinese understandings of death come from a blend
these traditions.
From indigenous roots China takes reluctance to dis-
cuss death and veneration of ancestors. From Confucian-
ism it takes proper practices and filial piety, and from
Taoism, a focus on Nature, prolonging life and the idea
of life force that pervades the universe. To ensure the
passage from death to the status of ancestor, complex
rituals are required and begin immediately when the life
force is gone. Failure to perform appropriate rituals will
affect the deceased and the family ([86], p.160). The filial
obligations that arise from Confucianism may include
children protecting parents from the anxiety of a poor
prognosis by withholding information and by using
whatever means necessary to prolong their parents’ lives
as long as possible ([87], p.41).
Death occurs when the life force (Chi) leaves the body.
Chi, a concept in both Taoism and Chan Buddhism, is
not located in any one organ but is physically diffused
throughout the body. Neurological criteria for determin-
ing death are not easily reconciled with the idea of chi.
Although death practices are changing in China, the idea
of a good death occurring at home, in the main hall in
the presence of ancestor tablets is still cherished. Proper
place of death helps the deceased attain the status of
ancestor and ensures harmony ([86], p.156-157).
Pure Land Buddhism is layered onto and practiced
alongside these ideas. Dying at home is preferred. To
ensure a good death, the dying person focuses on
Amitabha by chanting, Amituofo. Family will gather in
the patient’s room to help the individual chant. Pure
Land Buddhists believe the subtle body leaves the body
over a twelve to twenty-four hour time period after res-
piration ceases. During this time the patient can still feel
pain and sadness [86]. Specific rituals will assist the
deceased in a safe arrival in the Pure Land. If the process
of dying is interrupted, the newly deceased person, an-
cestors already in the Pure Land, and the current family
will suffer. Pure Land adherents prefer not to start artifi-
cial means of life support but treatment may be with-
drawn if the family feels its obligations to the individual
have been met.
Not everyone in China follows all these practices, to
be sure, and there is an emerging view that “some trad-
itional views of life and death have become cultural
obstacles blocking scientific approaches to the dying
process” ([88], p.36). In response to attempts to manage
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Wills’ that direct relatives to bring individuals home to
die and instruct them in proper ritual performance [89].
Japanese traditions
Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism migrated to Japan
and became part of the Japanese religious landscape
which also includes the indigenous Japanese religion,
Shinto, the way of the Gods. Widely practiced, Shinto is
an optimistic religion that focuses on life, purity, and
seasonal rituals [90]. Reverence for nature and what is
natural are hallmarks of Shinto. Death is a source of im-
purity in the Shinto tradition; there are no Shinto fu-
nerals or cemeteries. Shinto priests will use the rituals of
Buddhism or Taoism when performing funeral rituals.
In Japan, most people die in hospital; the medical in-
frastructure accommodates itself to death rituals by pro-
viding a space in the hospital where the family and
hospital staff gather with the newly deceased for ritual
practice. Determining death through neurological cri-
teria has provoked serious controversy in Japan. Al-
though criteria for brain death were legislated in
1997,x medical and lay individuals routinely state their
discomfort with these criteria, saying that brain death is
“unnatural,” “too unnatural to be called death,” “going
against natural science” [91]. John McConnell locates the
source of this discomfort in the conflict between the
neurological definitions of death and the basic goals of
Shinto, “preservation of life, promotion of good health,
and harmonization with nature in accordance with
the way of kami” (87], p.322). Shinto followers, he notes,
“believe that to declare death while the heart is still beat-
ing is premature, as well as unnatural; again, nature is
paramount in their beliefs.” This, he argues, is the reason
that a society that accepts medical intervention in much
of life resists it in death ([90], p.324). Helen Hardacre has
written a nuanced article on Japanese Buddhist and
Shinto responses to attempts to define death medically.
She notes that the Buddhist principle of engi, in which
the individual is always becoming, is difficult to reconcile
with the death of any particular organ or a particular
moment in time [91].
Tibetan traditions
Buddhism entered Tibet from India,y and blended with
Hinduism, Pure Land Buddhism and Tibet’s indigenous
Bön tradition. Bön includes shamanic belief and prac-
tices to banish demons and gain favor from protective
divinities and rituals concerning the transmigration of
souls after death. A complex system for understanding
and negotiating the stages of dying developed from
the combination of these religious traditions ([4], p.22).
The text, known in English as The Tibetan Book of the
Dead, is read at the bedside of the dying to help themreach the goal of the Clear Light, a state similar to
Nirvana.z Reading continues for three days after the
determination of vitality, heat and consciousness be-
cause the subtle body has not yet left the physical
body in its journey to its next life. The dying process
takes a total of forty-nine days after respiration stops
[81]. This practice can be incorporated with Pure Land
practices for the less spiritually adept who may not have
the expertise to enter the Clear Light but have the poten-
tial to reach an area where they can improve their
chances in their next life.
In her influential book, Buddhism, Bioethics, and
Death, Karma Lekshe Tsomo notes that in Tibetan
Buddhism there are four ways of determining death. The
first requires consultation with a lama who through div-
ination or meditative processes determines whether the
subtle consciousness has left the body; the second, third,
and fourth depend on empirical observations of the body
and include seeing a drop of mucus on the nostrils,
determining the loss of body heat, and witnessing
the beginning of physical decomposition ([4], p.219).
“The critical point for Buddhist,” she writes, “is whether
the subtle consciousness is still present in or around the
body, though this is not easy to determine.” Tsomo notes
that for many forms of Buddhism disturbing or dispos-
ing of the body before it is completely clear that the
subtle consciousness has departed is “potentially dam-
aging and can lead to fear, attachment and unfortunate
migrations” ([4], p.218).
Tsomo recommends not beginning mechanical sup-
port at the end of life, since the discomfort it might
causes would interfere with the calmness essential to a
good death. Once mechanical support is started, how-
ever, Tsomo cautions that it should not be discontinued
until it can be determined that the subtle consciousness
has left the body through the methods mentioned above.
She notes that common methods of assessing the pres-
ence or absence of ordinary consciousness may be able
to measure brain function, but “current scientific instru-
ments are still unable to detect or measure the very
subtle consciousness that is thought to continue from
one life to the next.” She goes on to state that “current
definitions of death that are linked to brain stem func-
tion are inadequate to determine the viability of human
life” ([4], 220)aa.
Western Buddhism
Over the past several centuries various forms of
Buddhism have intersected with the West in a variety
of ways, including Colonialism and War, but philo-
sophical and religious interest began in earnest at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. At first, “Buddhism
was not exported from abroad by Asian emissaries; it was
imported from within by European orientalists” who were
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eral Buddhist societies. These emphasized the rational basis
for Buddhist belief ([92]:82). By the 1970’s several forms of
Buddhism become popular in North America and Europe
when monks exported their traditions. ([92]:595).
These include Soka Gakki International, which is dis-
cussed above, Zen, and a new Western form of Tibetan
Buddhism, Shambhala.
Scholars distinguish three ways in which practitioners
relate to Western Buddhism. The first is practiced by
individuals whose ancestors emigrated from areas
where Buddhism was the main tradition. Jōdo Shinshu
Buddhist Churches of America, for example, founded in
the United States in the nineteenth century is home to
Buddhists of Japanese descent. A second type, “ethnic
Buddhism, is found among newer immigrants, exiles, and
refugees who have come to the United States in the
past thirty years from South, Southeast, Central, and
East Asian countries,” and a third, often called ‘convert
Buddhism,’ refers to those who have turned to Buddhism
since the 1960’s ([93]:xix). bbSince the first two types are
similar on the issues at hand to the traditions in the coun-
tries in which they originated, this section will focus on
two forms of convert Buddhism popular in the West, Zen
Buddhism from Japan, and Shambhala, a new form of
Tibetan Buddhism.
Western convert types of Buddhism differentiate
themselves by focusing more on meditation and less on
ritual, emphasizing lay practice, and following ‘engaged
Buddhism’ which is the “broadening of spiritual practice
to include both family and community and the social
and environmental concerns of the broader world”
([94]:71). In addition, they draw on a wide variety of ma-
terial from other faith traditions, science and philosophy.
Western Zen
After World War II, clerics who were dissatisfied with
Zen institutions in Japan began to see the United States
as a location for the revitalization of Zen that would be
“unencumbered by its institutional history”. By the end
of the 1960’s Zen had become the most prominent form
of Western Buddhism ([95]:112).
Western and Japanese Zen differ in a number of ways.
There are two forms of Zen in Japan, but in the West
they have been merged. Japanese Zen is monastic;
Western Zen is a lay movement. Western convert Zen
does not carry with it Taoist, Shinto and indigenous
practices such as ancestor worship.
Western Zen Centers support hospices to provide
compassionate care for the dying; Zen practitioners and
teachers write considerably about caring for the dying
but very little about clinical definitions of death and
withdrawal mechanical. The focus, when discussing
death, is on a good death, which is an aware death. Thegoal is to avoid a death where the patient is not con-
scious when the heart stops beating [96].
In those few places where clinical issues are raised,
Western Zen like all other forms of Buddhism, believes
the process of dying begins with the cessation of the
heart and lungs and ends some time later, often three
days, when the subtle consciousness leaves the body
[97]. ccNeither cardio-pulmonary cessation nor brain
death criteria are accepted in Zen as definitions of what
might be called ultimate death though they are seen as
definitions of clinical death. In an article on transplants,
Casey Frank writes, “it is generally believed that the cir-
cumstances of clinical death and the period following it,
before the consciousness is released, are critical in help-
ing to determine one’s rebirth.” Frank notes that two
Zen Masters, Sheng-Yen and Tangen Harada Roshi
believe an individual can overcome the difficulties of
disturbing what they see as someone in the process of
dying during organ removal. Others argue that it is
better to avoid organ donation in case the difficulties
cannot be overcome [98].
Withdrawing treatment from an unconscious, dying
patient presents issues similar to those of organ dona-
tion. The interruption of the dying process can produce
serious, unwanted consequences in rebirth [99].
Shambhala international
Tibetan monk Chögyam Trungpa developed what is
now called Shambhala in North America in the 1970’s.
Trungpa’s goal was to produce a non-monastic form of
Buddhism “free from the cultural trappings of Tibet”
[99:75]. Belief in demons and rituals to placate them that
are common in Tibetan indigenous religions are not part
of this Western form. Shambhala adherents blend their
own pre-existing ideas, such as ideas about the nature of
body and soul, with their Buddhist views. Shambhala is
eclectic and while rooted in Tibetan Buddhism it draws
on other Eastern traditions religion as well [100]. The
differences between Buddhism in Tibet and Shambhala
in the West result in some variations in both thinking
and practice.
Blending existing ideas, incorporating the views of
other faith expressions, philosophy and science, and
making the religion distinctly your own is characteristic
of adherents in this group. The Auckland Shambhala
Center in New Zealand states: “A unique quality of the
Buddhist teachings is that they can be expressed through
existing cultural norms, making use of them rather than
destroying or replacing them. This allows many west-
erners to practice Buddhism today without renouncing
their cultural heritage or radically changing their life-
styles” [101].
In his book, Preparing to Die, American Shambhala
teacher, Andrew Holecek outlines the basic features of
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draws heavily on the Tibetan Book of the Dead as one
would expect. But his work takes several decidedly
Western turns. He opens his book with the statement,
“Don’t measure your death against any other, and don’t
feel you have to die a certain way. Let your life and your
death be your own. There are certain things in life we
just do our own way” ([101]:4). Focusing on the individ-
ual and allowing them to choose their own path is typ-
ical of what several scholars, beginning with Martin
Baumann, refer to as “Protestant Buddhism” because it
cedes authority to the lay individual and focuses heavily
on self-education [102].
Holecek, who writes for the Shambhala organization,
views the practices of the Tibetan Book of the Dead as
the most valuable in preparing for death. He carefully
explains the ritual practices relating to the deceased and
cautions against moving the body until three days after
the heart has stopped beating. But in a major departure
from Tibetan understanding and practice, he adds, “If
the dead person is an organ donor, the generosity of of-
fering their body supersedes these instructions. Organ
harvesting should begin immediately.” Rather than see-
ing the process of dying solely in the terms explained in
Tibetan Buddhism, he describes clinical death “as either
(1) the irreversible cessation of all the functions of the
brain, including the brain stem, and (2) as an irrevers-
ible cessation of circulation, heartbeat, and breathing”.
Holecek and Shambhala as an institution, in sharp
contrast to the majority of non-Western Buddhists,
believe that the dying individual can overcome the difficul-
ties in reaching the appropriate afterlife that interrupting
the dying process would produce [101]:164).
Although the majority of Buddhist writing on with-
drawing treatment determines that it will have harmful
consequences for both the dying individual and the per-
son who actively participates in this process, Shambhala
has a nuanced view that shows Western influence. Ac-
tively killing someone, as in most traditions, is wrong
because the karmic effects, even if the intent is good,
will be eternal and negative. Removing life support sys-
tems, which Shambhala calls passive euthanasia, “only
has a soft karmic effect that can easily be overcome”.
Holecek writes, “There comes a point when there’s no
need to prolong life and incur unnecessary emotional
and financial burdens” ([101]:264).
Conclusion
Patterns emerge in the comparative study of religious
perspectives on death. Western traditions show their
rootedness in Judaism in their understanding of the hu-
man individual as a finite, singular creation. Although
the many branches of Western religions do not agree on
precisely how to determine death, they are all able tolocate a moment of death in the body. In Eastern tradi-
tions personhood is not defined in physical terms. More-
over, the influence of indigenous systems on the
religions of Hinduism and Buddhism is significant. From
prescribing the location of death, to resisting medical
intervention and definitions of death, Hinduism and
Buddhism in their many forms, echo these indigenous
traditions. Adding to the complexity for these two tradi-
tions is the idea that death is a process that continues
after the body has met most empirical criteria for deter-
mining death. For Hinduism and Buddhism, the cessa-
tion of heart, brain and lung function is the beginning of
the process of dying—not the end.
Although not all members of a given tradition will be-
lieve or practice in the same way, they are often guided
by the religious perspectives which surround them. In
times of crises, and the death of a loved one is surely
such an event, even the agnostic might summon long
forgotten symbols, rituals and prayers and draw comfort
from them.
In his book, The Sacred Canopy, sociologist of religion
Peter Berger wrote, “The power of religion depends, in the
last resort, upon the credibility of the banners it puts in the
hands of” its followers “as they stand before death, or more
accurately, as they walk inevitably toward it” ([103], p.115).
In the face of death, religious systems have provided mech-
anisms for coping with all the areas of life into which the
death of a loved one intrudes—from prescriptions and pro-
scriptions on handling the body, to ritual obligations that
provide concrete actions the family can perform on behalf
of the deceased, to comforting visions of afterlives. The
struggle with medical definitions of death on the part of
many world religions comes, in no small measure, because
of the symbol systems and the ways in which they function
to keep anomie at bay.dd
Endnotes
aThis comparative exploration is narrowly focused on
which criteria different religions find appropriate when
determining death. It does not include a discussion of
patients in a persistent vegetative state; no religious trad-
ition considers such a patient dead.
bIn non-Western traditions, the absence of a heartbeat
and/ or respiration would be a signal that the process of
death was beginning; it would not indicate that death
had occurred.
cRabbi and physician, Moses Feinstein initially op-
posed the definition of death developed by the Harvard
criteria; later he came to embrace it. His views are
shared by others including Gedalia Schwartz, Moshe
Tendle and the chief rabbinate of Israel.
dBleich is joined in his perspective by other revered
Rabbis including Hershel Schachter and Mordechai
Willig.
Setta and Shemie Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine  (2015) 10:6 Page 19 of 22eThe italicized section is Rabbi Moses Isserles’ gloss on
Joseph Karo, Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 339 that was
completed in 1563.
gSee for example, Mackler A: Life and Death Responsi-
bilities in Jewish Medical Ethics. New York: The Jewish
Theological Seminary of America; 2000.
h For the bioethicist, he adds knowledge of science.
iThe Church of Christ Scientist, (Christian Science), was
founded by Mary Baker Eddy in 1879. As an institution,
Christian Science does not approve of any medical
intervention, hence it has no pronouncements on moral
issues that involve medical treatment. Individual Christian
Scientists are free to make their own decisions.
jWere there church pronouncements, they would
not be binding on the members of these groups ex-
cept in the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Blood trans-
fusions are specifically and absolutely prohibited
because of what this group sees as a clear Biblical
mandate against them. Partaking of a transfusion will
have, in their view, eternal consequences and will
lead to an individual being disfellowshipped from their
organization.
kJehovah’s Witnesses are not allowed to receive bone
marrow transplants because of the possibility of trans-
planting blood. Transplant surgery from living or ca-
daver donation is allowed if the surgery is bloodless.
Organ donation is encouraged.
lThis web-site of this Association lists the following
members: Advent Christian General Conference,
Assemblies of God, Baptist General Conference, The
Brethren Church (Ashland, Ohio), Brethren in Christ
Church, Christian & Missionary Alliance, Christian
Catholic Church (Evangelical Protestant), Christian Church
of North America, Christian Reformed Church in North
America, Christian Union, Church of God (Cleveland,
Tennessee), Church of God, Mountain Assembly, Inc.,
The Church of the Nazarene, Church of the United
Brethren in Christ, Churches of Christ in Christian
Union, Conservative Baptist Association, Conservative
Congregational Christian Conference, Conservative
Lutheran Association, Elim Fellowship, Evangelical Church
of North America, Evangelical Congregational Church,
Evangelical Free Church of America, Evangelical Friends
International of North America, Evangelical Mennonite
Church, Evangelical Methodist Church, Evangelical
Presbyterian Church, Evangelical Missionary Fellowship,
Fellowship of Evangelical Bible Church, Fire Baptized
Holiness Church of God of the Americas, Free Methodist
Church of North America, General Association of General
Baptists, International Church of the Foursquare Gospel,
International Pentecostal Church of Christ, International
Pentecostal Holiness Church, Mennonite Brethren
Churches, USA, Midwest Congregational Christian
Fellowship, Missionary Church, Inc., Open Bible StandardChurches, Pentecostal Church of God, Pentecostal Free
Will Baptist Church, Inc., Presbyterian Church in America,
Primitive Methodist Church, USA, Reformed Episcopal
Church, Reformed Presbyterian Church of North America,
The Salvation Army, Synod of Mid-America (Reformed
Church in America), and the Wesleyan Church.
mIn 1988, The Lutheran Church in America merged
with the American Lutheran Church and the Association
of American Lutheran Churches to form the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America. Together with the Lutheran
Church Missouri-Synod and the Wisconsin Synod, they
comprise the largest three forms of Lutheranism in the
United States.
nThe split between the two main divisions of Islam,
the Shiite and Sunni occurred shortly after Islam was
founded. Though these two groups can diverge widely
on many theological and practical issues, they do not
differ in general on the issue at hand despite the rift
between them.
oHadith is the narration of the teaching of the prophet
transmitted by those who heard him. The Sunnah is
the code of practices taught by the Prophet.
pThus a brain dead patient can inherit and the spouse
is not widowed.
qThe authors note that individuals who are less trad-
itional will have views that are more moderate.
rHome in this context seems to mean variously, the
location of the family unit and the actual dwelling place.
See also [79] 429-431.
sOther reasons are sometimes given for this; the prac-
tice varies little however.
tSee [80] for a discussion of Bhikkhu Mettananda and
L.H. Van Loon. See also [83].
uSee also [84].
vBuddhists note that consciousness may not be observ-
able and recount stories of the Buddha and saints who
were mistakenly declared dead when they were in a
meditative trance. See also [3].
wChan Buddhism developed, in part, because some
Buddhists believed Pure Land to be overly simplistic.
Chan is not focused on a heavenly paradise but is a
meditative school focusing on developing the individual
self. Pure Land Buddhism is highly popular in China;
Chan appeals more to people in the West.
xSee [90]. Japan has two definitions of death; neuro-
logical criteria are used for people who have previously
consented to organ donation and cardio-respiratory
death for everyone else.
yThe origins of Tibetan Buddhism are unclear. There
are features of Hinduism and both Chinese and Indian
Buddhism in the tradition found in Tibet.
zThe actual title is Bardo Thodol; it is typically trans-
lated as the liberation through hearing during the inter-
mediate states.
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Buddhist community. Buddhist scholar Damien Keown,
once one of the few Buddhist proponents for accepting
neurological criteria in determining death, has now
changed his position after being asked to review Tsomo’s
book on Buddhism and bioethics ([3], p.1). Keown now
calls for a robust set of tests that include the cardiovas-
cular, respiratory, and nervous systems to determine
death in accordance with Buddhist thought ([3], p.1).
bbNot all convert practitioners of these traditions are
alike, however. American born Tibetan nun and Buddhist
scholar, Karma Lekshe Tsomo exemplifies the convert who
holds firmly to the original form of their new tradition.
Tsomo’s form of Tibetan Buddhism closely resembles what
one might find in Tibet and indeed she studied there.
ccWestern Zen Buddhism offers many resources relat-
ing to death and dying but these do not include discus-
sions about determining death or withdrawing treatment.
See the website of the Upaya Zen Center located in Santa
Fe, New Mexico [97].
ddThe controversy about, confusion with, and difficulty
with neurologically based definitions of death in Japan
illustrates this. Scholars from several fields have discussed
the reasons for resistance in Japan; Jīro Nudeshima prof-
fers the theory that the difficulty arises from distrust of
the medical profession while philosopher Ominé Akira ar-
gues that animism is at the root of the controversy [72].
Margaret Lock and John McConnell both note that ac-
ceptance of medical definitions, new imaging technologies,
and reproductive technologies have met little resistance in
Japan. Lock writes that anxiety about the management of
death apparently threatens the social order as most other
forms of medical intervention do not [72].
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